Introduction
"Perhaps the time is past for the comprehensive "grand" vision. In some ways, it was a necessary substitute for ignorance, a compensation in breadth for the lack of depth in man's understanding of his world. But even if this is so, the result of more knowledge maybe greater ignorance or, at least, the feeling of ignorance about where we are and where we are heading, and particularly where we should head, than was true when in fact we knew less but thought we knew more.
I am not sure that this need be so. In any case, I am not satisfied with the fragmented, microscopic
understanding of the parts, and I feel the need for some even if crude approximation of a larger perspective.
This book is an effort to provide such a perspective. It is an attempt to define the meaning within a dynamic
framework of a major aspect of our contemporary reality: the emerging global political process which
increasingly blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics. In working toward that
definition, I shall focus particularly on the meaning for the United States of the emergence of this process,
seeking to draw implications from an examination of the forces that are molding it.
Time and space shape our perception of reality. The specific moment and the particular setting dictate
the way international estimates and priorities are defined. Sometimes, when the moment is historically "ripe," the
setting and the time may coalesce to provide a special insight. A perceptive formula is easier to articulate in a
moment of special stress. Conditions of war, crisis, tension are in that sense particularly fertile. The situation of
crisis permits sharper value judgments, in keeping with man's ancient proclivity for dividing his reality into good
and evil. (Marxist dialectic is clearly in this tradition, and it infuses moral dichotomy into every assessment.) But
short of that critical condition which in its most extreme form involves the alternatives of war or peace
global politics do not lend themselves to pat formulations and clear-cut predictions, even in a setting of extensive
change. As a result in most times it is extraordinarily difficult to liberate oneself from the confining influence
of the immediate and to perceive from a detached perspective the broader sweep of events.
Any abstract attempt to arrive at a capsule formula is bound to contain a measure of distortion. The
influences that condition relations among states and the broad evolution of international affairs are too various.
Nonetheless, as long as we are aware that any such formulation inescapably contains a germ of falsehood and
hence must be tentative the attempt represents an advance toward at least a partial understanding. The
alternative is capitulation to complexity: the admission that no sense can be extracted from what is happening.
The consequent triumph of ignorance exacts its own tribute in the form of unstable and reactive policies, the
substitution of slogans for thought, the rigid adherence to generalized formulas made in another age and in
response to circumstances that are different in essence from our own, even if superficially similar.
Today, the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance, the United States) are beginning
to emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology and
especially electronics hence my neologism "technetronic" are increasingly becoming the principal
determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of
society. And precisely because today change is so rapid and so complex, it is perhaps more important than ever
before that our conduct of foreign affairs be guided by a sense of history and to speak of history in this
context is to speak simultaneously of the past and of the future.
Since it focuses on international affairs, this book is at most only a very partial response to the need for
a more comprehensive assessment. It is not an attempt to sum up the human condition, to combine philosophy
and science, to provide answers to more perplexing questions concerning our reality. It is much more modest
than that, and yet I am uneasily aware that it is already much too ambitious, because it unavoidably touches on
all these issues.
The book is divided into five major parts. The first deals with the impact of the scientific-technological
revolution on world affairs in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principal
disseminator of that revolution the United States and analyzing the effects of the revolution on the so-called
Third World. The second part examines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, and
format of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular reference to the changing role of ideology.
The third part assesses the contemporary relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at the
experience of the Soviet Union and then examining the over-all condition of international communism as a
movement that once sought to combine internationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the United
States, a society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind; it seeks to define the thrust of change
and the historical meaning of the current American transition. The fifth part outlines in very broad terms the
general directions that America might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussed
foreign and domestic dilemmas.
Having said what the book does attempt, it might be helpful to the reader also to indicate what it does
not attempt. First of all, it is not an exercise in "futurology"; it is an effort to make sense of present trends, to
develop a dynamic perspective on what is happening. Secondly, it is not a policy book, in the sense that its object
is not to develop systematically a coherent series of prescriptions and programs. In Part V, however, it does try
to indicate the general directions toward which America should and, in some respects, may head.
In the course of developing these theses, I have expanded on some of the ideas initially advanced in my
article "America in the Technetronic Age," published in Encounter, January 1968, which gave rise to
considerable controversy. I should add that not only have I tried to amplify and clarify some of the rather
condensed points made in that article, but I have significantly revised some of my views in the light of
constructive criticisms made by my colleagues. Moreover, that article addressed itself to only one aspect
(discussed primarily in Part I) of the much larger canvas that I have tried to paint in this volume.
It is my hope that this essay will help to provide the reader with a better grasp of the nature of the
political world we live in, of the forces shaping it, of the directions it is pursuing. In that sense, it might perhaps
contribute to a sharper perception of the new political processes enveloping our world and move beyond the
more traditional forms of examining international politics. I hope, too, that the tentative propositions, the
generalizations, and the theses advanced here though necessarily speculative, arbitrary, and in very many
respects inescapably inadequate may contribute to the increasing discussion of America's role in the world.
In the course of the work, I have expressed my own opinions and exposed my prejudices. This effort is,
therefore, more in the nature of a "think piece," backed by evidence, than of a systematic exercise in social-
science methodology*
Finally, let me end this introduction with a confession that somewhat anticipates my argument: an
apocalyptic-minded reader may find my thesis uncongenial because my view of America's role in the world is
still an optimistic one. I say "still" because I am greatly troubled by the dilemmas we face at home and abroad,
and even more so by the social and philosophical implications of the direction of change in our time.
Nonetheless, my optimism is real. Although I do not mean to minimize the gravity of America's
problems their catalogue is long, the dilemmas are acute, and the signs of a meaningful response are at most
ambivalent I truly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and, increasingly, the will to
surmount the difficulties inherent in this current historic transition.
In this respect, I share the view of Barrington Moore, Jr., that "when we set the dominant body of current thinking against important figures in the nineteenth century, the following differences emerge. First of all, the critical spirit has all but disappeared. Second, modern sociology,
and perhaps to a lesser extent also modern political science, economics, and psychology, are ahistorical. Third, modern social science tends to be abstract and formal. In research, social science today displays considerable technical virtuosity. But this virtuosity has been gained at the expense of content. Modern sociology has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago" (Political Power and Social Theory, "
"BETWEEN TWO AGES:
America's Role in the Technetronic Era "
---Zbigniew Brzezinski
"Perhaps the time is past for the comprehensive "grand" vision. In some ways, it was a necessary substitute for ignorance, a compensation in breadth for the lack of depth in man's understanding of his world. But even if this is so, the result of more knowledge maybe greater ignorance or, at least, the feeling of ignorance about where we are and where we are heading, and particularly where we should head, than was true when in fact we knew less but thought we knew more.
I am not sure that this need be so. In any case, I am not satisfied with the fragmented, microscopic
understanding of the parts, and I feel the need for some even if crude approximation of a larger perspective.
This book is an effort to provide such a perspective. It is an attempt to define the meaning within a dynamic
framework of a major aspect of our contemporary reality: the emerging global political process which
increasingly blurs the traditional distinctions between domestic and international politics. In working toward that
definition, I shall focus particularly on the meaning for the United States of the emergence of this process,
seeking to draw implications from an examination of the forces that are molding it.
Time and space shape our perception of reality. The specific moment and the particular setting dictate
the way international estimates and priorities are defined. Sometimes, when the moment is historically "ripe," the
setting and the time may coalesce to provide a special insight. A perceptive formula is easier to articulate in a
moment of special stress. Conditions of war, crisis, tension are in that sense particularly fertile. The situation of
crisis permits sharper value judgments, in keeping with man's ancient proclivity for dividing his reality into good
and evil. (Marxist dialectic is clearly in this tradition, and it infuses moral dichotomy into every assessment.) But
short of that critical condition which in its most extreme form involves the alternatives of war or peace
global politics do not lend themselves to pat formulations and clear-cut predictions, even in a setting of extensive
change. As a result in most times it is extraordinarily difficult to liberate oneself from the confining influence
of the immediate and to perceive from a detached perspective the broader sweep of events.
Any abstract attempt to arrive at a capsule formula is bound to contain a measure of distortion. The
influences that condition relations among states and the broad evolution of international affairs are too various.
Nonetheless, as long as we are aware that any such formulation inescapably contains a germ of falsehood and
hence must be tentative the attempt represents an advance toward at least a partial understanding. The
alternative is capitulation to complexity: the admission that no sense can be extracted from what is happening.
The consequent triumph of ignorance exacts its own tribute in the form of unstable and reactive policies, the
substitution of slogans for thought, the rigid adherence to generalized formulas made in another age and in
response to circumstances that are different in essence from our own, even if superficially similar.
Today, the most industrially advanced countries (in the first instance, the United States) are beginning
to emerge from the industrial stage of their development. They are entering an age in which technology and
especially electronics hence my neologism "technetronic" are increasingly becoming the principal
determinants of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, the values, and the global outlook of
society. And precisely because today change is so rapid and so complex, it is perhaps more important than ever
before that our conduct of foreign affairs be guided by a sense of history and to speak of history in this
context is to speak simultaneously of the past and of the future.
Since it focuses on international affairs, this book is at most only a very partial response to the need for
a more comprehensive assessment. It is not an attempt to sum up the human condition, to combine philosophy
and science, to provide answers to more perplexing questions concerning our reality. It is much more modest
than that, and yet I am uneasily aware that it is already much too ambitious, because it unavoidably touches on
all these issues.
The book is divided into five major parts. The first deals with the impact of the scientific-technological
revolution on world affairs in general, discussing more specifically the ambiguous position of the principal
disseminator of that revolution the United States and analyzing the effects of the revolution on the so-called
Third World. The second part examines how the foregoing considerations have affected the content, style, and
format of man's political outlook on his global reality, with particular reference to the changing role of ideology.
The third part assesses the contemporary relevance of communism to problems of modernity, looking first at the
experience of the Soviet Union and then examining the over-all condition of international communism as a
movement that once sought to combine internationalism and humanism. The fourth part focuses on the United
States, a society that is both a social pioneer and a guinea pig for mankind; it seeks to define the thrust of change
and the historical meaning of the current American transition. The fifth part outlines in very broad terms the
general directions that America might take in order to make an effective response to the previously discussed
foreign and domestic dilemmas.
Having said what the book does attempt, it might be helpful to the reader also to indicate what it does
not attempt. First of all, it is not an exercise in "futurology"; it is an effort to make sense of present trends, to
develop a dynamic perspective on what is happening. Secondly, it is not a policy book, in the sense that its object
is not to develop systematically a coherent series of prescriptions and programs. In Part V, however, it does try
to indicate the general directions toward which America should and, in some respects, may head.
In the course of developing these theses, I have expanded on some of the ideas initially advanced in my
article "America in the Technetronic Age," published in Encounter, January 1968, which gave rise to
considerable controversy. I should add that not only have I tried to amplify and clarify some of the rather
condensed points made in that article, but I have significantly revised some of my views in the light of
constructive criticisms made by my colleagues. Moreover, that article addressed itself to only one aspect
(discussed primarily in Part I) of the much larger canvas that I have tried to paint in this volume.
It is my hope that this essay will help to provide the reader with a better grasp of the nature of the
political world we live in, of the forces shaping it, of the directions it is pursuing. In that sense, it might perhaps
contribute to a sharper perception of the new political processes enveloping our world and move beyond the
more traditional forms of examining international politics. I hope, too, that the tentative propositions, the
generalizations, and the theses advanced here though necessarily speculative, arbitrary, and in very many
respects inescapably inadequate may contribute to the increasing discussion of America's role in the world.
In the course of the work, I have expressed my own opinions and exposed my prejudices. This effort is,
therefore, more in the nature of a "think piece," backed by evidence, than of a systematic exercise in social-
science methodology*
Finally, let me end this introduction with a confession that somewhat anticipates my argument: an
apocalyptic-minded reader may find my thesis uncongenial because my view of America's role in the world is
still an optimistic one. I say "still" because I am greatly troubled by the dilemmas we face at home and abroad,
and even more so by the social and philosophical implications of the direction of change in our time.
Nonetheless, my optimism is real. Although I do not mean to minimize the gravity of America's
problems their catalogue is long, the dilemmas are acute, and the signs of a meaningful response are at most
ambivalent I truly believe that this society has the capacity, the talent, the wealth, and, increasingly, the will to
surmount the difficulties inherent in this current historic transition.
In this respect, I share the view of Barrington Moore, Jr., that "when we set the dominant body of current thinking against important figures in the nineteenth century, the following differences emerge. First of all, the critical spirit has all but disappeared. Second, modern sociology,
and perhaps to a lesser extent also modern political science, economics, and psychology, are ahistorical. Third, modern social science tends to be abstract and formal. In research, social science today displays considerable technical virtuosity. But this virtuosity has been gained at the expense of content. Modern sociology has less to say about society than it did fifty years ago" (Political Power and Social Theory, "
"BETWEEN TWO AGES:
America's Role in the Technetronic Era "
---Zbigniew Brzezinski